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Abstract: Two broad forces shape the patterns of marital sorting by education: 
structural constraints and assortative mating. However, we lack specific and 
comparative quantification of the extent of these two forces. In this paper, we measure 
the specific contributions of (i) assortative mating, (ii) the level of college education and 
(iii) the gender gap in education on marital sorting patterns and the corresponding 
polarization levels between college and non-college educated couples. Unlike previous 
studies, we adopt a large- cross-national approach including 118 countries and more 
than 258 observations spanning from 1960 up to 2011. Methodologically, we develop 
counterfactual modelling techniques to compare observed patterns of marital sorting 
with expected patterns derived from alternative structural and assortative mating 
conditions. Our findings indicate that changes in college marital sorting and increases in 
polarization between college- and non-college-educated populations are 
overwhelmingly driven by structural constraints, namely the expansion of college 
education. Instead, educational assortative mating plays a limited role – accounting only 
for 5% of the observed changes in marriage market polarization. 
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The heightened tendency to mate individuals with similar levels of education more 
frequently that would be expected under random circumstances (i.e. educational 
assortative mating) has potentially contributed to the increasingly unequal and diverging 
societies that are at the center of recent scholarship concerns (McLanahan 2004, 
Reardon, 2011). Yet, while assortative mating captures most of the sociological 
attention (Mare 1991, Schwartz and Mare 2005), mating patterns are predominantly 
shaped by the structural constraints of the marriage market, that is, the composition of 
the marriageable population by educational attainment. Yet we lack specific and 
comparative cross-national quantification of the extent to which structural constraints, 
on one side, and assortative mating, on the other, influence the observed patterns of 
marital sorting across societies and contribute to marriage market polarization between 
high- and low-educated individuals. This paper documents macro-level patterns and 
trends in educational marital sorting in 118 countries and measures the influence of 
structural constraints and assortative mating. We focus on the divide between college 
and non-college education, the most salient educational boundary of the 21st century.  
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The paper adopts a macro and global perspective including countries representing more 
than 98% of today’s world population, with multiple observations over time. The data 
spans from 1960 to 2011. Most data for this analysis come from the international 
version of Integrated Public Use of Microdata Series (IPUMS-i) database of census 
microdata samples, with a complementary use of various household surveys.  This 
allows capturing macro structures of marital sorting between college and non-college 
across societies with markedly different levels of college-educated populations. To 
assess the degree to which the marriage market is partitioned between college and non-
college educated couples, we propose an index of ‘marriage market polarization’ (or 
‘polarization’ for short). Such index allows ranking societies based on the extent to 
which married populations split in the arguably two most socially distant groups: 
college-educated couples and the non-college educated ones. In addition, this index 
permits easy decompositions and manageability to different counterfactual scenarios, 
which are employed to quantify the relative contribution of structural constraints and 
assortative mating to the countries’ observed levels of polarization.   
Our findings indicate that the increasing polarization between college- and non-college-
educated populations is overwhelmingly driven by structural constraints, namely the 
expansion of college education, and that educational assortative mating plays a very 
limited role. 
 
 2. Background 
The importance of being college-educated in the marriage market 
5 
 
As the world embraces the tenets of an increasingly globalized and competitive 
knowledge-based economy, college education will become the most salient educational 
boundary of the 21st century as literacy was during the 19th century and a significant part 
of the 20th century. The importance of being college educated is noticeable in many 
dimensions of people’s lives. College-educated individuals tend to have higher levels of 
employment, better paying jobs, better health outcomes and greater access to cultural 
resources than do non-college-educated ones (Hout 2012, Harmon et al. 2001). In 
addition, these outcomes have implications on the wellbeing of children (Atkinson et al. 
2011, Guryan et al. 2008); a circumstance that contributes to the intergenerational 
transmission of (dis)advantage as children of college-educated parents have, on average, 
better school and health outcomes (Lamerz et al. 2005, Davis-Kean 2005).  
Education is also one of the most important stratification variables of demographic 
behavior (Lutz, Butz and KC 2014). High-educated people tend to form unions and 
have children later in time. They also show different propensities to opt for cohabitation 
instead of marriage and to dissolve their unions. Despite the strength and the direction 
of the relationship between education and these transitions vary widely across countries 
and over time, being college-educated matters for most of these transitions. And partner 
choice is not an exception.  
Education influences the age at which individuals enter the marriage market, structures 
the opportunities of the marriage market and shapes expectations towards marriage and 
potential mates (Kalmijn 1998, Mare 1991, Blossfeld 2009, Blossfeld and Timm 2003). 
If not the most important, educational attainment is a major stratifying dimension of 
modern marriage markets. By level of education, the college educated tend to show the 
highest levels of homogamy (Smits, Ultee and Lammers 2000, Smits and Park 2009,  
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Scwhartz and Mare 2005, Schwartz 2013). As a result, college education has become 
the main dividing line in modern marriage markets across the globe (Smits 2003), 
including in the US (Scwhartz and Mare 2005), Europe (
East Asia (Smits and Park 2009) and Latin America (Esteve and McCaa 2007). 
Universities are efficient marriage markets. They bring together men and women of 
similar ages at the age in which they typically engage in their first long-term dating 
relationships. Universities contribute to homophily in social networks (McPherson et al. 
2001), which is later reproduced in the working and leisure environments and in digital 
social networks as well (Potarca 2017).  
Factors that shape who marries with whom 
Social scientists have long been interested in who marries whom because of its 
informative power regarding social stratification and its implications for the 
intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage. As stated in Kalmijn (1998), mating 
patterns are driven by structural opportunities, third party influences and individual 
preferences. Measuring these clearly defined dimensions has always been a challenge 
because of data limitations and interactions between factors.  
Most research on assortative mating relies on cross-sectional observations of mating 
patterns derived from censuses, register data and surveys. The analyses have consisted 
in comparing the observed distribution of couples to the random distribution of couples 
based on the same structural constraints or alternative model specifications. The gap 
between the observed and the expected distribution has been used as an indirect 
measure of the force of assortative mating (Schwartz 2013, Schwartz and Mare 2005, 
Smits et al. 1998). Whereas this approach has been criticized for neither including the 
population at risk nor providing a clear measurement of individual preferences or third 
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party influences, it is widely accepted as an indicator of the extent to which individuals 
mate within or across groups beyond what it would be expected under random 
circumstances. By and large, log-linear models are the most popular techniques in this 
type of analyses. They offer the possibility of examining the interaction between two or 
more variables beyond marginal constraints. When applied to cross-tabulations of 
spousal characteristics, in our case educational attainment, evidence consistently shows 
strong support for assortative mating.  
Beyond assortative mating, mating patterns also depend on the structure of the marriage 
market, i.e., the distribution of the marriageable population by educational attainment. 
We distinguish between two structural factors: the level of college of education and the 
gender gap in education. The expansion of college education3 will mechanically 
contribute to the growth of college-educated couples but will also broaden opportunities 
for non-college-educated individuals to find a college-educated partner and form a 
‘mixed’ (i.e., heterogamous) couple. An important feature of the expansion of college 
education and its influence on the marriage market is the gender gap in education. The 
expansion of college education has not been gender neutral (Dorius and Firebaugh 
2010; Dorius 2013; Grant and Behrman 2010). Initially favoring males, the gender gap 
has closed rapidly in recent years and, in many countries, has even reversed in favor of 
women (Esteve, Garcia and Permanyer 2012), a trend that is expected to continue over 
the next few decades4 (KC et al. 2010; Lutz and KC, 2011). Therefore, the ‘excess’ of 
college-educated women may reduce the number of college-educated couples and 
                                                          
3 While by 1970 6.4% of the world’s population aged 25-29 had obtained a college degree, three decades 
later, this proportion had increased to 13%, and the expected figure for 2050 is 29.4% (KC et al. 2010). 
4 In 1970, men represented 63.6% of the total college-educated population. This percentage decreased to 
52.6% in 2000, and it is likely to reach 44% in 2050, with most high-income countries reaching lower 
levels (KC et al. 2010). 
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increase the number of heterogamous couples, more specifically those in which women 
have more education than their male partners (Esteve et al. 2012; 2016).  
Marriage market polarization 
In recent times, some scholars have expressed their concerns about the potentially 
negative consequences of increasing assortative mating (Schwartz and Mare 2005, 
Esping-Andersen 2009, Blossfeld 2009, Schwartz 2013, Kalmijn 2013). If resourceful 
individuals form couples together, and people without resources partner each other too, 
differences across households are expected to be higher compared to a situation where 
partnerships are formed across those groups. In association with other family dynamics 
(like increasing single parenthood among low social status households, maternal 
employment bias in favor of the higher educated, or the deteriorating position of low-
skilled males), assortative mating is expected to further increase the distance between 
social strata and lead to increasingly unequal and polarized societies (Esping-Andersen 
2016) – that is: societies separated in opposite and antagonistic poles (e.g., ‘the rich’ vs 
‘the poor’, or ‘the highly educated’ vs ‘the low educated’). Scholars have expressed 
similar concerns when inspecting recent polarizing dynamics in the distribution of 
income (e.g. Esteban and Ray 2011), or in the distribution of population shares across 
ethno-linguistic or religious groups (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, Esteban et al 
2012). Put together, these studies provide empirical evidence that increasing 
polarization along socio-economic lines could have potentially negative consequences 
for the corresponding societies. 
In an attempt to measure the extent to which the population in union is partitioned in 
two opposite and antagonistic poles (the college-educated couples and the non-college 
educated ones), we introduce an index of ‘marriage market polarization’ (or, simply, 
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‘polarization’). Our polarization measure is maximized in the absence of mixed couples, 
as this is expected to be scenario where social closure and distance between strata are at 
their height. The polarization index proposed in this paper serves a double purpose. 
First, it allows identifying whether societies are approaching those distributions that 
have triggered recent scholarly and policy concerns5. Second, the measure is amenable 
to different counterfactual exercises that allow quantifying how important the structural 
constraints and assortative mating are when explaining changes in the observed levels 
of polarization.   
Conditioned by the nature of the data, the measure of polarization we propose is 
confined to prevailing couples within specific age groups. Given that at these ages a 
sizeable share of the population may not be in union and the probability of not being in 
union may vary by educational attainment, we cannot directly extrapolate the observed 
levels of polarization within couples to the total population. We will perform sensitivity 
analysis to assess whether excluding the population not in union will have had a large 
effect on our measure of polarization. Besides, educational homogamy is not the only 
source of polarization in the marriage markets. Marriage markets are also heavily 
stratified by other dimensions such as ethnicity, race, wealth, income or socioeconomic 
status. Education might partially capture these dimensions to the extent they are inter-
correlated.  However, we are not examining in this paper the relationship between 
education and other dimensions of the marriage market and, thus, this limitation 
conditions the interpretations of our results.  
                                                          
5 Albeit defined in a different way, several scholars have examined the relationship between economic, 
religious or ethnic polarization and the levels of social tension, unrest, violence, or even the occurrence of 
Civil Wars (e.g. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, Esteban and Ray 2011, Esteban et al 2012). 
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Previous research based on country-specific case studies has already investigated 
whether changes in inequality can be accounted for by changes in educational 
assortative mating (Breen and Salazar 2011, Breen and Andersen 2012). As a possible 
explanation to the small effect of the latter on the former identified in the US (Breen and 
Salazar 2011), it has been hypothesized that changes in education assortative mating 
might not have been large enough to produce the expected effect on inequality 
(Schwartz 2013). Following this line of thought, in this paper we use counterfactual 
techniques to test whether extreme levels of assortative mating could have substantially 
altered the levels of marriage market polarization (more details given in section 4.4). 
Aims of the paper 
This paper contributes to the literature on marital sorting patterns by education in 
several ways. We measure the specific contributions of (i) assortative mating, (ii) the 
level of college education and (iii) the gender gap in education on marital sorting 
patterns and the corresponding polarization levels in a truly global perspective. By 
adopting a large- cross-national perspective including 118 countries with repeated 
observations spanning from 1960 up to 2011, we contribute to previous findings that 
have examined related issues for Europe (De Hauw et al. 2017; Grow and Van Bavel, 
2015) or that have investigated the implications of the gender gap reversal in education 
on assortative mating in an international perspective (Esteve et al. 2012; 2016).  
To achieve our goals, we have developed a set of formal identities to characterize 
patterns of educational marital sorting and the corresponding polarization levels as a 
function of the three aforementioned factors. These mathematical identities prove very 
useful to (a) quantify precisely the relationships between the two sets of variables 
(section 4.1), and (b) develop the counterfactual and benchmarking techniques we have 
11 
 
introduced to compare observed patterns of marital sorting with the hypothetical 
patterns that would be observed if other structural conditions or behavioral traits 
prevailed (sections 4.3 and 4.4). Inter alia, this allows investigating whether polarization 
levels would be substantially different if alternative levels of assortative mating had 
been operating.  
 
3. Data 
Our analysis is based on a vast collection of census and survey microdata samples from 
118 countries spanning 1960 to 2011, which represent more than 98% of today’s world 
population. We have gathered 258 samples of microdata, obtaining 149 census samples 
from the Integrated Public Use of Microdata Series International project (Minnesota 
Population Center, 2014); 63 from Demographic and Health Surveys; 37 from European 
Labor Force Surveys; 5 from the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; 
and 4 from the Generations and Gender Survey. By decade, there are 5 samples from 
the 1960s, 25 from the 1970s, 28 from the 1980s, 69 from the 1990s, 94 from the 2000s, 
and 37 from the 2010s. By continent, 57 samples come from 32 African countries, 53 
from 28 Asian countries, 74 from 33 European countries, 68 from 24 Latin American 
countries, 5 from North America (the United States) and 1 from Australia (Oceania). 
The final dataset includes only samples in which the education of the spouses can be 
identified.  
The analysis is restricted to the population in heterosexual married or cohabiting unions 
in which the women are 25-34 years old. In this way, we minimize the biases of union 
dissolution, educational upgrades and remarriage (Schwartz and Mare 2012) and avoid 
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overlapping cohorts across observations because in most cases, our observations are 10 
or more years apart. The final dataset totals more than 14 million weighted individual 
records.  
The analysis is restricted to the in union population. As mentioned before, this has some 
limitations because it does not consider unmarried individuals (e.g. singles, divorcees, 
separated and widows).  This is a recurring limitation in this type of research. Therefore, 
caution is required when equating mating preferences and our measure of assortative 
mating and polarization. The later only captures the deviation of the observed 
distribution of couples from the expected one under a random allocation of spousal 
characteristics. Whereas this is not a perfect measurement of assortative mating, we 
expect that we are able to capture the main differences across countries. To assess 
whether the main findings of the paper are overly affected by the aforementioned 
methodological choices, we have done two kinds of sensitivity analyses. On the one 
hand, we have taken into consideration models incorporating the unmarried population6. 
On the other hand, we have considered alternative age ranges of the married population 
(e.g. 30-39). The main findings of the paper are not altered when choosing these 
alternative criteria (results not shown here but available from the authors upon request).  
Educational attainment is dichotomized into non-college and college education. 
Educational systems vary widely across the globe, and thus, their harmonization is 
                                                          
6 Following the methodological approach suggested in Breen and Salazar (2011:822-833), we have 
implemented counterfactual modelling techniques that take into consideration both the married and the 
unmarried populations. The advantage of this approach is that it encompasses the entire marriage market. 
The disadvantage is that its estimation requires numerical approximation based iterative optimization 
techniques (e.g. the Deming-Stephan algorithm) that do not admit analytical (i.e. ‘solvable’) solutions like 
the ones developed in this paper when restricting the attention to the population in union (see the set of 
identities in equation [7]). Since the models focusing on the entire population and the ones focusing on 
the married population generate very similar outcomes, we have opted for the last ones (i.e. the simplest 
and most parsimonious).  
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problematic (Esteve and Sobek 2003). However, there are some educational thresholds 
that are fairly standard across societies. College education is one of them. Virtually all 
censuses and surveys used in our research identify completed college / tertiary 
education without ambiguity (coding is available from the authors). Depending on the 
country, this category might be broken down into several categories. For instance, there 
are countries that distinguish between graduates and post-graduate levels (e.g. Master’s 
and PhDs). However, this distinction is not available in all censuses and, when it is, the 
available sub-categories within college education are not always comparable. For the 
sake of comparability,  we use the IPUMS-i harmonized version of educational 
attainment, which provides careful metadata on the criteria used to classify each of the 
items available in the enumeration forms. As a rule, IPUMS-i groups all types of post-
secondary education that lead to a university degree under ‘college completed’. Post-
secondary technical education is not considered as ‘college completed’.  
A more relevant issue concerning data comparability is the fact that for some countries, 
especially those with small populations with college education (as is the case in most 
African countries), having college or not may not be a relevant boundary in their 
respective marriage markets. However, for the sake of comparability and with the 
intention of measuring the impact of our three explanatory factors in various contexts, 
we purposely include these countries. Identifying which educational thresholds 
constitute the most important barriers in each marriage market is beyond the scope of 
this paper. In addition, the use of country specific measures of educational attainment 
would also oblige to differentiate within college educated populations in those countries 
in which the majority of the population has attained this level. In doing this, we would 
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miss the intention of this paper, which is to measure the extent to which marriage 
markets are divided between college and non-college educated couples.  
 
4. Analytical strategy 
Since we focus on the population living in union and we only consider two educational 
attainment groups (those with college and those without college education), we use 2×2 
contingency tables with 4 possible combinations to describe marital sorting patterns. 
The first combination corresponds to couples in which neither member has a college 
education; their share in the coupled population (or population in union) is denoted by 
‘a’. Analogously, ‘d’ represents the share of couples in which both partners are college 
educated; ‘b’ represents the share of couples in which men have no college education 
but women have; and ‘c’ represents the opposite combination. Technically speaking, the 
couples counted in ‘a’ and ‘d’ are homogamous, whereas the couples counted in ‘b’ and 
‘c’ are heterogamous. More specifically, the couples in ‘b’ are hypogamous (i.e. couples 
where women ‘marry down’), and the couples in ‘c’ are hypergamous (i.e. where 
women ‘marry up’). These shares will be indistinctly referred to as educational mating 
distribution, or marital sorting distribution, and will be briefly denoted as (a, b, c, d). 
Because a, b, c, d are shares, their sum is 1. It is important to highlight these four 
numbers simply describe the observed mating distribution among the population in 
union, which might follow assortative, random or disassortative patterns (an important 
aspect associated to the distribution that will be defined below).  
4.1. Three factors influencing the education mating distribution 
15 
 
In our approach, any observed educational mating distribution (a, b, c, d) results from 
the interplay of the following three factors:  
(i) The level of college education, measured as the share of the college-educated 
population within the coupled population, is denoted by E. Other factors kept 
constant, high values of E increase the share of college-educated couples, decrease 
the share of non-college-educated ones, and increase the share of mixed couples. 
Formally, we have  
𝐸𝐸 =
𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐 + 2𝑑𝑑
2
          [1] 
In addition, the share of college-educated women among women in unions is 
𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 = 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑          [2] 
and the share of college-educated men among men in unions is 
𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 = 𝑐𝑐+ 𝑑𝑑          [3] 




          [4] 
 (ii) The level of assortative mating is denoted by 𝐻𝐻 and measures the tendency 
among individuals to marry within the same educational groups, beyond the 
structural constraints imposed by the marriage market. Ceteris paribus, high levels of 
assortative mating tend to increase the shares of couples in which both members are 
either college or non-college educated while decreasing the share of mixed couples. 
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Formally, the level of assortative mating can be measured with the following 
indicator7: 
𝐻𝐻 = 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 − 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐          [5] 
 (iii) The gender gap in college education within the coupled population, denoted by 
G, measures the imbalances in the education distribution of women and men. When 
it is very different from zero, the number of homogamous couples that can be formed 
diminishes, whereas the potential number of mixed couples increases. Formally, the 
gender gap in education is defined as 
𝐺𝐺 = 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐 = 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 − 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚          [6] 
As shown in equations [1], [5] and [6], each educational mating distribution (a, b, c, d) 
has a corresponding level of college education (E), assortative mating (H) and gender 
gap (G). Interestingly, the opposite is true. For any specific combination of these three 
factors, there is one and only one educational mating distribution (a, b, c, d). This is 
shown in the following equations: 

































          [7] 
                                                          
7 This way of measuring the level of assortative mating was suggested in Permanyer et al. (2013). It bears 
some resemblance to the classical odds ratio parameter that is the basis of log-linear models 
Ω=(a/c)/(b/d)=ad/bc. Details on why assortative mating is defined in this way are given in Appendix C. 
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These mathematical identities (whose involved derivation is explained in Appendix A) 
show how the three factors, E, H, and G, are related to the educational mating 
distribution. Inspecting them, we corroborate that education expansion favors the 
increase in college-educated couples and the decrease in non-college-educated ones. In 
its initial stages (when E<1/2), it favors the increase in mixed couples, but in its later 
stages (when E>1/2), the opposite happens. Assortative mating (H) and the gender gap 
in education (G) have opposing effects: H favors the increase in equally educated 
couples, and G fosters the increased in mixed ones. While these relationships are 
straightforward and go in the direction one should a priori expect, the usefulness of the 
formal identities shown in [7] comes from the fact that they allow quantifying and 
measuring exactly not only the direction but also the magnitude of such relationships – 
which, otherwise, would be loosely labeled as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. In addition, these 
equations are the cornerstone upon which our novel counterfactual-based trend 
decomposition techniques are based (see section 4.3). 
Even if derived through an entirely different procedure, the identities shown in [7] are 
reminiscent of a saturated 2×2 log-linear model8 . In that setting, the specification of the 
different modelling parameters allows predicting exactly the observed number of cell 
counts. In our case, the specification of three variables (E, H and G) also “predicts” 
exactly the shares of each type of couple (i.e. 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑). Yet, the similarities between 
both approaches stop here. While the log-linear approach aims at predicting cell counts 
                                                          
8 In those saturated models, the log of the expected number of cell counts in a 2 × 2 bivariate table is 
commonly written as log�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 , where the parameters capture different effects 
associated to the variables we are working with (see Knoke and Burke 1980). 
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based on parsimonious models and relies on several methodological assumptions9, the 
method suggested in this paper has been specifically designed for the 2×2 setting and 
aims at quantifying the relative importance of 𝐸𝐸,𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺 to explain changes in the 
marital sorting distribution (i.e. ∆𝑎𝑎,∆𝑏𝑏,∆𝑐𝑐 and ∆𝑑𝑑) and the corresponding polarization 
levels (see below). 
4.2. Measurement of polarization 
“Marriage market polarization” (or, simply, “polarization”) measures the degree to 
which married populations split in two groups: college-educated couples and non-
college educated ones. In the economics literature, polarization is defined as the 
grouping of the population into significantly sized clusters such that each cluster has 
members with similar attributes (e.g. ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’; see Esteban and Ray 
1994). Adapted to our setting, an index of polarization aims to assess how far a given 
distribution is from a hypothetical scenario in which the population is divided into two 
equally sized and antagonistic groups (i.e., those with a college education vs. those 
without a college education). Formally, we work with the following polarization index: 








− (𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐)�
𝛼𝛼
�           [8] 
where α is a non-negative number that can be interpreted as a polarization sensitivity 
parameter10. We use the intermediate value of α = 2, but other values have been 
investigated with analogous results (which are available from the authors). This index is 
                                                          
9 For instance, ‘Observed frequencies are normally distributed around expected frequencies over repeated 
samples’, or ‘The logarithm of the expected value of the response variable is a linear combination of the 
explanatory variables’. 
10 When α→0, the relative contribution of the median category to polarization levels increases, whereas 
for increasing values of α, the contribution of the median category decreases. 
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an ad hoc adaptation of the ordinal polarization index suggested by Apouey (2007: 885) 
for the case in which one works with 3 ordered categories. 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 is a standard index of 
polarization that measures the distance between a given distribution (a, b, c, d) and the 
bipolar case (1/2, 0, 0, 1/2), where the population is split in two equal-sized groups 
concentrated at the opposite extremes of the education distribution. 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼  satisfies the 
following classical properties expected from a polarization index: (i) 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼  is bounded 
between 0 and 1 (i.e. the values associated to minimal and maximal polarization, 
respectively); (ii) 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(1/2,0,0,1/2)=1 (i.e. polarization is maximized in the bipolar case, 
where half of the couples are college educated and the other half are non-college 
educated); and (iii) 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(1,0,0,0)= 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(0,1,0,0)= 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(0,0,1,0)= 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(0,0,0,1)=0 (i.e. 
polarization is minimized when the entire population in union is concentrated in one of 
the four possible cells and there is no variability).  
Polarization levels can thus be either expressed as a function of educational mating 
distributions (see equation [8]) or as a function of the level of college education,  
assortative mating and the gender gap (combine equation [7] in equation [8]). Both 
representations will be used to estimate the impact that these factors have had on 
polarization levels and its changes over time (see sections 4.3 and 4.4). 
4.3. Counterfactual modeling 
To assess the impact of 𝐸𝐸,𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺 on educational mating distributions and polarization, 
we ask what would have happened to the shares a, b, c, d and to 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 if we held constant 
two of the three quantities that appear in [7] (𝐸𝐸,𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺) at their value in an earlier 
period of time (𝑡𝑡1) and allowed the third to take a value observed later in time (𝑡𝑡2). In 
this way, we generate a counterfactual educational mating distribution for the later 
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period of time (𝑡𝑡2). By comparing the observed and the counterfactual patterns, we can 
assess how important the aforementioned factors are in explaining changes in the 
marital sorting distribution and the corresponding polarization levels11 (details shown in 
Appendix B). For that purpose, let us denote the educational mating distributions at 
times 𝑡𝑡1 and 𝑡𝑡2 as (𝑎𝑎1, 𝑏𝑏1, 𝑐𝑐1,𝑑𝑑1) and (𝑎𝑎2,𝑏𝑏2, 𝑐𝑐2,𝑑𝑑2), respectively. Likewise, 𝑃𝑃1𝛼𝛼 and 𝑃𝑃2𝛼𝛼 
denote the observed levels of polarization in times 𝑡𝑡1 and 𝑡𝑡2. We can now show how 
changes over time of our key variables can be neatly decomposed in the following three 
blocs: 
∆𝑎𝑎: = 𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑎𝑎1 = ∆𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎               [9] 
∆𝑏𝑏: = 𝑏𝑏2 − 𝑏𝑏1 = ∆𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏                [10] 
∆𝑐𝑐: = 𝑐𝑐2 − 𝑐𝑐1 = ∆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐                   [11] 
∆𝑑𝑑: = 𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑑𝑑1 = ∆𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑                [12] 
∆𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼: = 𝑃𝑃2𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃1𝛼𝛼 ≅ ∆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼      [13] 
where the different ∆𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥,∆𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥,∆𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥 respectively measure the influence of college 
education, assortative mating and the gender gap in education when explaining changes 
in the marital sorting distribution and the corresponding polarization levels (the detailed 
definitions and formulae are presented in Appendix B). The additive formulas shown in 
[9] – [13] are the ones we use to measure the contribution of E, H and G when 
explaining marital sorting and polarization trends over time. 
                                                          
11 Under somewhat stringent conditions, some factors (E, H or G) can be written as a perfect function of 
the other factors (for instance, when b=c=0, then H=E·(1-E)), so it is formally not possible to assess the 
effect of one factor ‘while holding others constant’. Yet, these special conditions turn out to be so 
restrictive that they have not been observed in our empirical sample and are unlikely to be observed in 
practice (e.g. they would require that absolutely all couples in a given country should be educationally 
homogamous) – so they are not affecting the decomposition methods presented in the paper. We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 
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It is relevant to emphasize that the methods presented in this paper are based on 
mathematical decomposition techniques, but they are not predictive models as generally 
understood. Unlike classical predictive modelling techniques (e.g. Ordinary Least 
Squares or Log-linear models) we are not aiming at predicting the estimated value of a 
dependent variable on the basis of a set of independent variables, and we are neither 
assuming there is an error term capturing unexplained factors and measurement errors. 
Likewise, we do not use classical methods like the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition – 
which is derived from the OLS framework – because we are not relying on model 
approximations of the variables of interest. On the contrary, the variables of interest (i.e. 
educational mating distributions and the corresponding polarization levels) are 
expressed as an exact function of other factors (E, H, G) and, hence, are able to unravel 
the effects that these factors have had on the changes over time in the ‘dependent 
variable’12. The approach followed in this paper is among the commonly used methods 
in sensitivity analysis – which can be defined as ‘the study of how the variation in the 
critical outcomes of a given system can be categorized and assigned, qualitatively or 
quantitatively, to different sources of variation in the system’ (Saltelli et al., 2008). Our 
decompositions  are purely formal exercises which prove to be extremely useful to test 
how educational marital sorting and the corresponding polarization levels react to 
hypothetical changes in E, H and G. Indeed, similar ideas have been recently used, 
albeit in somewhat different contexts, by Breen and Salazar (2010:147, 2011:824), 
Breen and Andersen (2012:876) and Permanyer et al (2013: 2214). 
4.4. Benchmarking exercises 
                                                          
12 In a way, our approach is like working with an accounting identity (that is: an identity that, by 
construction, is necessarily true – e.g. ‘population change’ = ‘births’ – ‘deaths’ + ‘immigration’ – 
‘outmigration’) and assessing the contribution of its different components. 
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A simple way of assessing the influence of assortative mating is to investigate the extent 
to which couples’ education distribution and the corresponding polarization levels 
would have been different under alternative levels of assortative mating. We derive the 
educational mating distribution and the polarization levels that would be observed in the 
two extreme and hypothetical scenarios of ‘absent’ (𝑎𝑎0, 𝑏𝑏0, 𝑐𝑐0,𝑑𝑑0) and ‘maximal’ 
(𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚) assortative mating (see Appendix C). The observed 
educational mating distribution (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑) and the corresponding polarization levels 
𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑) are bounded from below and from above by the aforementioned 
hypothetical education distributions with ‘absent’ and ‘maximal’ assortative mating, as 
observed in the following inequalities (see Appendix C for details): 
𝑎𝑎0 ≤ 𝑎𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑏𝑏0
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐0
𝑑𝑑0 ≤ 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚
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To benchmark these variables between the corresponding bounds, we normalize them to 
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These indicators are used to assess the potential influence of assortative mating on 




5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive findings 
Figure 1 shows the temporal and regional variation of the following key variables: 
college education, assortative mating, gender gap in education, and polarization levels. 
Every panel follows the same structure: the variable of interest is represented on the 
vertical axis; the horizontal axis represents time; each dot represents country 
observations at a specific point in time; and lines connect dots to show country trends 
over time. Color lines indicate the geographical region, based on the United Nations 
continental classification of countries, except for Mexico that was included among the 
Latin American countries. 
FIGURE 1 
The top left panel portrays the percentage of people with a college education within the 
coupled population (E) on a 0 to 1 scale. College education has expanded dramatically 
worldwide over the last five decades, but cross-national differences are large. The 
percentage of college-educated populations ranges from values below 1% in countries 
such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Rwanda and Sierra Leone to 
values above 40% in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland and the 
United Sates in recent years. Time trends show very little growth among African 
countries. European countries and the United States (North America) show the largest 
increases in college education (see Table 1).  
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The level of assortative mating (𝐻𝐻), i.e., the tendency to marry within the same 
educational group, has increased worldwide, with the exception of the African 
countries, where there is technically no assortative mating (see top right panel in Figure 
1). European countries and the United States have the highest levels of assortative 
mating. Average values of 𝐻𝐻 within Europe moved from 0.07 to 0.1 between 2000 and 
2010 (see Table 1), but there is a lot of heterogeneity across countries (see Figure 1 and 
Table A1 in the online appendix). The patterns and trends of assortative mating are 
fairly similar to those of the percentages of college-educated people (E). The correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is 0.91. Assortative mating is highest where the 
largest percentages of college-educated populations exist and vice versa.  
The gap in college education (G) between men and women is shown in the bottom left 
panel of Figure 1. Negative values indicate that the number of college-educated men is 
larger than the number of college-educated women. Positive values indicate the 
opposite. The general trend indicates that the gap between men and women is closing 
and even reversing in a growing number of countries. By 2010, the gap was completely 
reversed in all European countries except in Austria, where there was no gap in either 
direction. By 2000, most Latin American countries had completely closed the gap, with 
only a few of them lagging behind (e.g., Honduras and Bolivia). By the same year, the 
gender gap in college education was in favor of men in 12 out of 20 Asian countries for 
which we have data. In the other 8 countries, the gap was close to 0 or slightly in favor 
of women (e.g., Jordan, Palestinian Territory). In Africa, the gap is systematically in 
favor of men (see Table 1 for the regional average levels and Table A1 in the online 
appendix for country-specific results).  
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Lastly, on the bottom right panel of Figure 1, we report the level of marriage-market 
polarization between college-educated and non-college-educated populations, 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼, 
which is bounded between 0 and 1. 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 increases in all regions of the world but at 
markedly different levels and speeds, with Europe at the upper end, Africa at the lower 
end and Latin America and Asia and Oceania somewhere in between. 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 values range 
from almost 0 in countries such as Malawi, Niger and Tanzania to values above 0.9 in 
Luxembourg in 2011 (0.94), Ukraine in 2007 (0.92), the United Kingdom in 2011 
(0.91) and France in 2011 (0.91). In the early 2000s, polarization levels in Latin 
American, except Puerto Rico, were between 0.11 (Jamaica 2001) and 0.37 (Cuba 
2002). On average, marriage-market polarization in Asia is higher than it is in Latin 
America, but internal diversity is higher, with values ranging from 0.05 in Vietnam to 
0.85 in the Russian Federation (see Table 1 and Table A1 in the online appendix).  
 Overall, the four panels in Figure 1 are remarkably similar. The correlation coefficients 
between the level of polarization in the marriage market and the percentage of college-
educated people, assortative mating, and the gender gap are 0.97, 0.97 and 0.67, 
respectively, which implies that the highest levels of polarization are found in countries 
with the largest shares of college-educated populations and highest assortative mating. 
However, the question is which of these factors accounts for the most variation in 
marital sorting patterns and polarization observed across countries and over time. To 
answer this question, we use the decomposition methods presented in section 4.3.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
5.2. Decomposing changes over time using counterfactual techniques 
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To investigate the dynamics of change, we focus on change over time within countries. 
The analysis is restricted to countries with at least two observations in time, but only the 
most recent period of observation is taken into consideration. On average, these periods 
are 10.8 years long. This leaves us with 79 different countries covering all regions of the 
world.  
Using the decomposition formulas [9]-[13], we infer the absolute and relative 
contribution of education expansion, assortative mating and the gender gap in education 
to the changes over time in marital sorting distributions (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑) and the 
corresponding polarization levels 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼. The results are presented in Figures 2 and 3, 
respectively. Figure 2 is a collection of four ternary plots, each indicating the 
contribution of 𝐸𝐸,𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺 to changes in the corresponding ‘marital sorting shares’ (i.e. 
𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐 and 𝑑𝑑). The ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate increases and decreases over time in the 
corresponding shares. The closer a ‘+/–’ sign is to a given vertex, the more important 
the corresponding component is in explaining the changes in the corresponding share. 
For the case of 𝑎𝑎 (shares of non-college educated couples), we can see that (i) they tend 
to decrease over time, and (ii) such decrease is overwhelmingly explained by the 
expansion of college education (assortative mating and, particularly, the gender gap in 
education, play a very limited role; see upper left panel). For the cases of 𝑏𝑏 and 𝑐𝑐 
(shares of mixed couples) we observe more increases than decreases over time. In 
addition, such changes are mostly explained by increasing college education, followed 
by the gender gap in education (see upper right and lower left panels). Lastly, the 
generalized increases in college-educated couples can be more attributable to assortative 
mating than the expansion of college education (with the gender gap in education 
playing a negligible role; see lower right panel). 
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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In Figure 3, the absolute difference between polarization at time 𝑡𝑡 and polarization at 
time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is represented on the vertical axis. Negative values indicate that polarization 
has decreased over the observed period, and positive values signal an increase. On the 
horizontal axis, we represent the 79 observed periods ordered from the smallest to the 
largest amount of change. Change over time is decomposed into the contribution of 𝐸𝐸,𝐻𝐻 
and 𝐺𝐺 (see equation [13]).  College education is by far the most important factor 
contributing to the generalized increase in polarization over time, followed distantly by 
assortative mating. The gender gap in education tends to decrease polarization, but its 
overall impact is of negligible size. In relative terms (results not shown), the expansion 
of college education accounts for 94.3% of the change over time in 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼, assortative 
mating accounts for 5%, and the gender gap accounts for less than 1%. The vast 
majority of countries conform to this pattern.  
Despite the concerns that higher assortative mating might have contributed to generate 
increasingly unequal and diverging societies, we actually observe that the tendency to 
form homogamous couples has played a very modest role when accounting for the 
generalized raises in marriage market polarization. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
5.3. Could extreme changes in assortative mating affect marriage market polarization? 
A plausible hypothesis to explain the limited impact of assortative mating on changes in 
marriage market polarization is that the former might have been too small to have an 
important effect on the latter. To test this hypothesis, we investigate how polarization 
levels would look if alternative levels of assortative mating prevailed. We compare the 
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observed educational mating distributions (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑) with the ones that would be 
observed in the absence of assortative mating (𝑎𝑎0,𝑏𝑏0, 𝑐𝑐0,𝑑𝑑0)  and in the case of 
maximum assortative mating (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚), and we compute the 
corresponding 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼and 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼  levels. The results are shown in Figure 4. On the vertical 
axis, it displays the value of polarization. On the horizontal axis, it represents the 258 
data observations ordered from the lowest to the highest observed values of 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼. For 
every country-year observation, we represent the observed level of polarization, 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼, the 
level of polarization assuming absence of assortative mating, 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼, and the level 
assuming maximum assortative mating, 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼 .  
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
By definition, the observed level of polarization is always higher than 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼 and smaller 
than 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼  (see Appendix C). 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼 measures in absolute terms the ‘amount of 
polarization’ that is attributable to assortative mating. If we divide 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼 by 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼, we 
obtain a measure in relative terms of the amount of polarization that can be attributable 
to assortative mating. On average, 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼  values would have decreased only 6.1 percentage 
points had couples been formed at random (see the lower whiskers in Figure 4). This 
figure varies across regions but not substantially. In Europe and North America, an 
average of 12 percent of 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 is attributable to assortative mating. In Africa, such 
contribution is negligible and among Latin American and Asian countries it is below 
5% (see Table 1 for the regional average levels and Table A1 in the online appendix for 
country-specific results).  
Finally, we can divide 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼 by 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼 to obtain a relative measure of the 
distance between the observed polarization attributable to assortative mating and the 
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maximum it could have potentially achieved (see equation [15]). As observed in Figure 
4, the observed levels of polarization are systematically closer to 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼  than to 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼, 
indicating that assortative mating tends to maximize its potential. Furthermore, it turns 
out that there are no major variations across regions: all of them approach the global 
average of 71% (i.e., polarization levels would not have been much higher even if 
assortative mating had maximized its full potential).  
These findings confirm that assortative mating is relatively unimportant when 
explaining changes in marriage market polarization – which are mostly accounted for by 
the expansion of college education. 
 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this article, we have developed a methodology to disentangle and understand the 
intertwined effects of three factors that affect the educational mating distributions and 
the corresponding polarization levels. These factors are the expansion of college 
education, assortative mating, and the gender gap in college education. We have applied 
this methodology to data from 118 countries and more than 258 observations to 
investigate worldwide trends in polarization between low- and high-educated couples.  
We have shown that at high levels of college education, marriage markets become more 
polarized between college-educated and non-college-educated populations, as 
demonstrated by the growing absolute and relative numbers of college-educated couples 
in the marriage market. Together with the expansion of college education, the tendency 
to marry within the same educational group—i.e., assortative mating—is positively 
related to the size of college-educated people in the marriage market.  The changes in 
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marriage market polarization have been mainly driven by the process of education 
expansion rather than by assortative mating. The gender gap in education has played a 
negligible role. Therefore, the polarizing trends we observe in the world and its regions 
are barely influenced by the strengthening of assortative mating  but are influenced by 
the expansion of college education, which is likely to continue expanding in the coming 
years.  
A series of benchmarking and counterfactual exercises have allowed us to investigate 
the extent to which polarization levels would have been different under different levels 
of assortative mating. We have found that if couples were formed purely at random, 
polarization levels would have decreased by an average of only 6.1% of their observed 
values. This finding shows a rather modest contribution of assortative mating to 
polarization, despite being at 71% of its maximum potential contribution.  
In this context, one might wonder whether the global polarizing trends in terms of 
education shown in this paper are likely to have an effect on economic inequality 
around the world. Indeed, several researchers have expressed concerns as regards the 
current and future implications of increasing assortative mating on patterns of inequality 
(McLanahan and Percheski 2008, McCall and Percheski 2010, Schwartz 2013). While 
this is an extremely relevant issue that deserves thorough investigation, we can 
speculate on the findings that such research might reveal. To begin with, since 
inequality between countries depends on country-level average economic distances and, 
furthermore, assortative mating is not expected to have a major effect on those averages, 
we expect a null relationship between the education polarizing trends and inter-country 
inequality. However, it might have been the case that education-polarizing trends have 
been partially responsible for the observed increases in income inequality within 
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countries. In this regard, there are a few studies explicitly addressing this issue (see 
Breen and Salazar 2010, 2011, Breen and Andersen 2012, Boertien and Permanyer 
2017) but the evidence is so far scarce and inconclusive13. Since (i) global expansion of 
college education is expected to continue in the next decades, and (ii) given its close 
relationship with education polarization, it is not unlikely that the effects of the latter on 
within-country inequality will rise over time. 
Are the results presented in this paper “unavoidable” given the bounded nature of our 
variables and the parsimony of our models? Obviously, when no one is educated and 
when everyone is educated, there is no variability, so polarization is zero. In the process 
of education expansion, when some population groups receive extra education, there is 
increasing variability and therefore polarization. However, far less obvious are the 
following conclusions: (i) assortative mating plays a secondary role in driving the levels 
of polarization—a result that seems in line with the findings of Breen and Salazar 
(2011) in the US context, and (ii) the global reversal of the gender gap in higher 
education has had almost no effect on polarization. From a methodological perspective, 
we have developed an analytical strategy that neatly analyzes the contribution of the key 
social forces that drive changes in polarization and provides a broad overview of the 
macro-level trends that are taking place at the global level. 
In conclusion, polarization in the marriage markets inevitably increases because 
increasing shares of the population have access to and complete college education but 
                                                          
13 Breen and Salazar (2010, 2011) report a little to null effect of education assortative mating on income 
inequality in the UK and the US respectively, and Boertien and Permanyer (2017) reach similar 
conclusions in several high-income countries. On the other hand, the paper by Breen and Andersen (2012) 
finds that changes in assortative mating actually increased income inequality in Denmark. Currently, there 
are no analogous studies published for low- and middle-income settings, so the overall relationship 
between education assortative mating and income inequality remains unclear.  
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not because of the strengthening of assortative mating. If college-educated people were 
to become a majority, polarization levels would mechanically go down. A similar effect 
may have already occurred with basic literacy skills (Permanyer et al. 2013). The 
literate population was initially very scarce, and then, it began to grow; now, it is almost 
universal in many places.  
These results underscore the importance of structural constraints and understate that of 
assortative mating. This finding is, of course, not new, as previous research in the US 
has shown that mating patterns are predominantly driven by the marginal constraints. 
Since marginal distributions had little sociological interest compared to assortative 
mating, scholarship focused on the latter. Yet, our findings based on a global 
perspective comparing societies with markedly different levels of college education 
suggest that the strength of assortative mating might have been magnified.  
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Appendix A.  
The derivation of [7] is long and involved; it is explained in the following steps. 
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Step 1. Write a, b, c and d in terms of 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚,𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 and 𝐻𝐻 (see equations [2], [3] and [5] for 
definitions). This involves solving the following equations system: 
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 = 1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐 = 1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤





          [𝐴𝐴1] 
Solving [A1], we obtain 
𝑎𝑎 = (1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤)(1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚) + 𝐻𝐻
𝑏𝑏 = 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤(1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚) − 𝐻𝐻
𝑐𝑐 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤) − 𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑 = 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 + 𝐻𝐻 ⎭
⎬
⎫
          [𝐴𝐴2] 
Therefore, any education distribution (𝑎𝑎�, 𝑏𝑏�, ?̃?𝑐, ?̃?𝑑) with gender equality (i.e., 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 = 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 =
𝐸𝐸) can be written as 
𝑎𝑎� = (1 − 𝐸𝐸)2 + 𝐻𝐻
𝑏𝑏� = 𝐸𝐸(1 − 𝐸𝐸) − 𝐻𝐻
?̃?𝑐 = 𝐸𝐸(1 − 𝐸𝐸) − 𝐻𝐻
?̃?𝑑 = 𝐸𝐸2 + 𝐻𝐻 ⎭
⎬
⎫
          [𝐴𝐴3] 
Step 2. Starting from the education distribution (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑), we derive another 
distribution (𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔,𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔, 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔) with the same marginals and the same level of assortative 
mating as the original one but with no gender gap in education. For that purpose, we 
need to solve the following equations system:  
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 + 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐
𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔 + 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔 = 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔 − 𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 = 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 − 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐





          [𝐴𝐴4] 
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Solving [A4], we obtain 



































          [𝐴𝐴5] 
Step 3. Because [A5] is obtained after imposing gender equality, (𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔, 𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔, 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔)  can be 
considered a particular case of (𝑎𝑎�, 𝑏𝑏�, ?̃?𝑐, ?̃?𝑑). From [A3] and [A5], we can deduce that 























          [𝐴𝐴6] 
Lastly, the identities in [7] are obtained after basic algebraic manipulations of [A6]. 
 
Appendix B 
In this appendix, we show how the decomposition formulas [9], [10], [11], [12] and [13] 
are arrived at. For that purpose, we introduce the following notations. Let the college 
education levels, the level of assortative mating and the gender gap in college education 




 𝑎𝑎2𝐸𝐸 = 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸2,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑎𝑎2𝐻𝐻 = 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻2,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑎𝑎2𝐺𝐺 = 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺2)
�           [𝐵𝐵1] 
as the counterfactual shares of non-college-educated couples that would be observed in 
𝑡𝑡2 if we only changed over time E, H or G, while keeping the other two factors constant 
(see equation [7] for the definition of 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(. , . , . )). Analogously, we can define the 
counterfactual shares of college-educated couples 𝑑𝑑2𝐸𝐸 ,𝑑𝑑2𝐻𝐻 ,𝑑𝑑2𝐺𝐺  and heterogamous 
couples 𝑏𝑏2𝐸𝐸 , 𝑏𝑏2𝐻𝐻, 𝑏𝑏2𝐺𝐺 , 𝑐𝑐2𝐸𝐸 , 𝑐𝑐2𝐻𝐻, 𝑐𝑐2𝐺𝐺. 
 𝑑𝑑2𝐸𝐸 = 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑(𝐸𝐸2,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑑𝑑2𝐻𝐻 = 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻2,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑑𝑑2𝐺𝐺 = 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺2)
�           [𝐵𝐵2] 
 𝑏𝑏2𝐸𝐸 = 𝜑𝜑𝑏𝑏(𝐸𝐸2,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑏𝑏2𝐻𝐻 = 𝜑𝜑𝑏𝑏(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻2,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑏𝑏2𝐺𝐺 = 𝜑𝜑𝑏𝑏(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺2)
�           [𝐵𝐵3] 
 𝑐𝑐2𝐸𝐸 = 𝜑𝜑𝑐𝑐(𝐸𝐸2,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑐𝑐2𝐻𝐻 = 𝜑𝜑𝑐𝑐(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻2,𝐺𝐺1)
 𝑐𝑐2𝐺𝐺 = 𝜑𝜑𝑐𝑐(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺2)
�           [𝐵𝐵4] 
Now, we can define the following quantities: 
∆𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎2𝐸𝐸 − 𝑎𝑎1;  ∆𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏2𝐸𝐸 − 𝑏𝑏1;  ∆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐2𝐸𝐸 − 𝑐𝑐1;  ∆𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑2𝐸𝐸 − 𝑑𝑑1
∆𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎2𝐻𝐻 − 𝑎𝑎1;  ∆𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏2𝐻𝐻 − 𝑏𝑏1;  ∆𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐2𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐1;  ∆𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑2𝐻𝐻 − 𝑑𝑑1
∆𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎2𝐺𝐺 − 𝑎𝑎1;  ∆𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏2𝐺𝐺 − 𝑏𝑏1;  ∆𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐2𝐺𝐺 − 𝑐𝑐1;  ∆𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑2𝐺𝐺 − 𝑑𝑑1
�           [𝐵𝐵5] 
Thus, ∆𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 measures the difference between the share of non-college educated couples 
that would be observed in 𝑡𝑡2 if only college education had changed over time and the 
share of non-college educated couples observed in 𝑡𝑡1. In this way, ∆𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 can be 
interpreted as the influence of education expansion to the changes in the share of non-
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college educated couples. The remaining quantities defined in equation [B5] are defined 
in an analogous way. With these definitions and using the identities shown in [7], after 
simple algebraic manipulations one has that 
∆𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎 = (𝑎𝑎2𝐸𝐸 − 𝑎𝑎1) + (𝑎𝑎2𝐻𝐻 − 𝑎𝑎1) + (𝑎𝑎2𝐺𝐺 − 𝑎𝑎1) = 
= �𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸2,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1) − 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1)� + �𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻2,𝐺𝐺1) − 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1)�
+ �𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺2) − 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸1,𝐻𝐻1,𝐺𝐺1)� = 






















































� = 𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑎𝑎1 
This shows how the exact decomposition formula shown in [9] is arrived at. Following 
exactly the same techniques, it is straightforward to derive the decomposition formulas 
[10], [11] and [12]. For the decomposition formula [13], we introduce the following 
notation: 
∆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 = 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎2𝐸𝐸 , 𝑏𝑏2𝐸𝐸 , 𝑐𝑐2𝐸𝐸 , 𝑑𝑑2𝐸𝐸) − 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑏𝑏1, 𝑐𝑐1,𝑑𝑑1)
∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 = 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎2𝐻𝐻, 𝑏𝑏2𝐻𝐻 , 𝑐𝑐2𝐻𝐻,𝑑𝑑2𝐻𝐻) − 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎1,𝑏𝑏1, 𝑐𝑐1,𝑑𝑑1)
∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 = 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎2𝐺𝐺 , 𝑏𝑏2𝐺𝐺 , 𝑐𝑐2𝐺𝐺 , 𝑑𝑑2𝐺𝐺) − 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎1,𝑏𝑏1, 𝑐𝑐1,𝑑𝑑1)
�           [𝐵𝐵6] 
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Thus, ∆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 measures the change in polarization levels that would be observed if only 
education had changed over time (i.e. leaving assortative mating and the gender gap in 
education at their 𝑡𝑡1 levels). The quantities ∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼  and ∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 are defined analogously. It 
turns out that the decomposition formula 
∆𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼: = 𝑃𝑃2𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃1𝛼𝛼 ≅ ∆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼           [𝐵𝐵7] 
is “quasi-exact”: the changes in polarization over time (∆𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼) do not coincide exactly 
with the sum of the contributions of 𝐸𝐸,𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺 to changes in polarization, but they are 
extremely similar. To prove this assertion, the scatterplot shown below compares for the 
samples included in our paper the values of 𝑃𝑃2𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃1𝛼𝛼 on the horizontal axis versus the 
values of ∆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 in the vertical one. As can be seen, the relation is 
almost perfectly linear (the correlation coefficient between both variables equals 0.998), 
and the approximation error is extremely small. Therefore, it makes perfect sense to say 
that changes in polarization can be decomposed in the contributions of 𝐸𝐸,𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺, 




















𝛼𝛼   
Polarization changes (∆𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 ) 
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Figure B1. Scatterplot comparing the values of 𝑃𝑃2𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃1𝛼𝛼 (horizontal axis) and the 
values of ∆𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 + ∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 (vertical axis) for the set of 79 countries considered in 
this paper for which we have at least two observations over time. Authors’ calculations 
based on IPUMS, DHS, EU-LFS, GGS and EU-SILC data. 
 
Appendix C. 
In this appendix, we show how to obtain the hypothetical education distributions 
(𝑎𝑎0, 𝑏𝑏0, 𝑐𝑐0,𝑑𝑑0) and (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚) that would be observed under extreme 
assortative mating assumptions. 
A simple way of measuring assortative mating is to compare the observed educational 
mating distribution (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑) with the hypothetical distribution (𝑎𝑎0, 𝑏𝑏0, 𝑐𝑐0,𝑑𝑑0) that 
would be observed if individuals did not care about their partners’ education (i.e., if 
couples were formed purely at random) while keeping the marginal education 
distribution of women and men unchanged. It is well known that under such an 
independence assumption, one has  
𝑎𝑎0 = (𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏)(𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐);𝑏𝑏0 = (𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏)(𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑); 𝑐𝑐0 = (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑)(𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐);𝑑𝑑0 = (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑)(𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑)      [𝐶𝐶1] 
Because these are the expected frequencies that would be observed if partners’ 
education played no role in the process of union formation, the difference between 
observed and expected values could be interpreted as measuring assortative mating. 
These differences will be labeled as  
𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎0;𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 = 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑏𝑏0; 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐0;  𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 = 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑑𝑑0          [𝐶𝐶2] 
As shown in Permanyer et al. (2013), one has  
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𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 = 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 − 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐          [𝐶𝐶3] 
𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 = 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 − 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑          [𝐶𝐶4] 
Therefore, if one defines 𝐻𝐻 = 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 − 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐, then any educational mating distribution 
(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑) can be rewritten as 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝐻𝐻
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏0 − 𝐻𝐻
𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐0 − 𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑0 + 𝐻𝐻
�           [𝐶𝐶5] 
Equation [C5] shows a decomposition of observed cell frequencies as a sum of 
frequencies that would be observed if education status were irrelevant for couples’ 
formation plus a term 𝐻𝐻 that could be interpreted as the level of assortative mating. 
Positive values of 𝐻𝐻 indicate that in the population under study, there is a tendency 
toward assortative mating (indeed, this is the case for all observations in our sample.)  
Thus far, we have compared the education distribution shares with a hypothetical 
education distribution that results from assuming the absence of a relationship between 
education status and couples’ formation. A conceptually related but somewhat different 
way of approaching the same problem is to attempt to answer the following question: to 
what extent would the education distribution shares be different if maximal assortative 
mating patterns prevailed? It is straightforward to verify that when the marginal 
education distributions of women and men are fixed, the distribution that maximizes 
assortative mating is the one that concentrates the maximum number of couples in the 
main diagonal of the couples’ education distribution table: 
 Non-college Woman College Woman Total 
Non-college Man 𝑎𝑎 + min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐} 𝑏𝑏 − min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐} 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 
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College Man 𝑐𝑐 − min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐} 𝑑𝑑 + min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐} 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑 
Total 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑 1 
 
Therefore, we define (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚) as 
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 𝑎𝑎 + min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐}
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 𝑏𝑏 − min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐}
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 𝑐𝑐 − min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐}
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 𝑑𝑑 + min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐}
�           [𝐶𝐶6] 
Under the assumption that 𝐻𝐻 ≥ 0 (a restriction that holds true in all our empirical 
observations), using equations [C5] and [C6] it is straightforward to prove the validity 
of the several inequalities shown in [14], that is: 
𝑎𝑎0 ≤ 𝑎𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚;  𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑏𝑏0;  𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐0;  𝑑𝑑0 ≤ 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚;𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑) ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼  
With these definitions, it is straightforward to check that the first four identities in [15] 














𝐻𝐻 + min {𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐}





Figure 1. Percentage of college-educated people (E), assortative mating (H), gender gap 
in college education (G) and observed polarization Pα across 258 observations spanning 
118 countries since the 1960s. Authors’ calculations based on IPUMS, DHS, EU-LFS, 





Figure 2. Contribution of the college education expansion (E), assortative mating (H) 
and the gender gap in education (G) to changes over time in marital sorting 
distributions, in 79 countries (‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate increases and decreases in the 
corresponding couple education combination, respectively). The three numbers within 
each triangle indicate the percentage of observations where E, H or G are the most 
important contributing factors, respectively. The blue dot indicates the average across 










Figure 3. Contribution of the college education expansion (E), assortative mating (H) and the gender gap in education (G) to changes over time in the 
marriage market polarization between college and non-college educated populations, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼, in 79 countries. Authors’ calculations based on IPUMS, 





Figure 4. Levels of polarization in the marriage market between college and non-college educated populations according to observed values, 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼, and two 
counterfactual scenarios—absence of assortative mating, 𝑃𝑃0𝛼𝛼, and maximum assortative mating, 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼 —across 258 observations spanning 118 countries. 







Table 1. College education, assortative mating, gender gap in education and polarization 
levels by regions over time. 
Region Period Countries Samples E H G P Pmax PzeroH 
Africa Before 1995 8 9 0,010 0,003 -0,008 0,039 0,039 0,038 
 
1995-2004 25 27 0,017 0,006 -0,014 0,063 0,063 0,061 
 
2005 and later 22 22 0,027 0,013 -0,011 0,101 0,101 0,096 
 
Total 32 58 0,020 0,008 -0,012 0,073 0,074 0,070 
     
 
    Asia & 
Oceania 
Before 1995 8 17 0,037 0,016 -0,017 0,134 0,136 0,128 
1995-2004 23 23 0,095 0,034 -0,013 0,300 0,312 0,276 
2005 and later 13 13 0,180 0,057 0,007 0,467 0,493 0,408 
 
Total 28 53 0,097 0,034 -0,010 0,288 0,300 0,261 
     
 
    Europe 
& US 
Before 1995 9 23 0,104 0,043 -0,030 0,347 0,356 0,317 
1995-2004 25 25 0,225 0,074 0,036 0,627 0,663 0,545 
2005 and later 32 32 0,351 0,095 0,100 0,792 0,843 0,660 
 
Total 35 80 0,241 0,074 0,043 0,613 0,647 0,525 
     
 
    LAC Before 1995 17 40 0,050 0,018 -0,017 0,179 0,183 0,170 
 
1995-2004 17 17 0,079 0,031 0,001 0,272 0,279 0,254 
 
2005 and later 10 10 0,075 0,033 -0,006 0,266 0,271 0,249 
 
Total 23 67 0,061 0,024 -0,011 0,215 0,220 0,203 
     
 
    World Before 1995 42 89 0,057 0.023 -0.019 0.200 0.204 0.187 
 
1995-2004 90 92 0,104 0.036 0.003 0.314 0.328 0.282 
 
2005 and later 77 77 0,194 0.057 0.039 0.471 0.498 0.403 
  Total 118 258 0,115 0.038 0.006 0.321 0.336 0.285 
Authors’ calculations based on IPUMS, DHS, EU-LFS, GGS and EU-SILC data.  
 
 
